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Introduction
This chapter concentrâtes on the various ways in which conflict prevention and early
warning have become part of the political agendas of international agencies. The
agencies discussed are inter-governmental institutions, i.e. international organizations
like the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Coopération in Europe
(OSCE) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The importance and rôle of
NGOs in early warning and conflict prevention are discussed in the next chapter.
As mentioned in the Introduction, after the end of the Cold War international
organizations became increasingly interested in the ideas of conflict prevention and
early warning as possible cornerstones for new or improved policies to résolve or
contain conflicts. In view of intensive and complex conflict situations such as in
Somalia and Bosnia, äs well as the failure of the United Nations and other organizations
to end these Woody civil wars, it was feit that it would be better to respond to conflicts
at a much earlier stage, preferably before thé éruption of violence or, at any rate, before
violence would escalate. One would stand a better chance to résolve or abate a conflict
when passions would not yet have been aroused and thé parties to the conflict would
consequently still be more amenable to thé reasoning of intervening agencies; in other
words, precisely thé arguments that are articulated by those sections of the académie
and NGO communities which are involved in the research or propagation of conflict
prevention and early warning.
However, while early warning and conflict prevention have become part of the
vocabulary of international diplomacy, this does not automatically mean that inter-
governmental organizations and their member states hâve actually designed and
pursued stratégies of conflict prevention. Since the early 1990s many words have been
devoted by politicians, diplomats and (international) civil servants to thé concepts and
ideas underlying conflict prevention and mechanisms of early warning. Yet thé question
in this chapter is whether international organizations hâve devised any concrète plans,
policies, institutions and mechanisms for the prevention of conflict and, if so, whether
these have been activated at ail in spécifie situations. And if international agencies hâve
indeed begun to engage in conflict préventive practices, what have been the results of
these new activities?
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In concentrating on the practice, rather than the scholarly constructs, of early warning
and conflict prevention, this chapter will also discuss what kind of developments and
events are treated by international organizations as signais of potential violent conflict,
quite apart from the question of whether such events or factors should - from the
perspective of social science théories on early warning and causes of conflict - be
considered as thé real indicators of impending or escalating violence. Related to this,
thé chapter provides a général, comparative outline of the underlying concepts of
security as used by these institutions, as well as of the mechanisms and procedures, if
any, that are geared towards preventing the éruption or escalation of violent conflict.
Early Warning and Conflict Prevention in Politics: Conceptual Fluidity
The first thing that strikes one when investigating the actual practice of conflict
prevention in international politics is the lack of conceptual rigour, indeed the sloppi-
ness, with which the notions of early warning and conflict prevention are surrounded.
Both conflict prevention and early warning are hardly ever defined or conceptually
distinguished from each other, or other terms and notions. In practice the two terms are
used almost interchangeably. This is in stark contrast to theoretical perspectives on
early warning which, as shown in the Introduction, treat early warning as a spécifie
aspect of, and necessary prerequisite to, conflict prevention in général. While it is true
that, as is discussed in chapter 4, there is a symbiotic relationship between early
warning and conflict management - or, for that matter, prevention - since action with
regard to abating, resolving or averting strife is always based on some sort of early or
late warning signal, the notions of early warning and conflict prevention point in
essence to empirically distinct phenomena.
Yet in the glib practice of international diplomacy the concepts of early warning
and conflict prevention are frequently used in a vague, inarticulate way, almost as
magie code words which conform to a new and fashionable trend in academie parlance
and which are faithfully listed alongside other concepts or methods of tackling conflict,
such as fact-finding, médiation, conflict resolution and conflict management. In this
context early warning and conflict prevention are at times not only used interchange-
ably, but also as Synonyms for other concepts. For instance, in the Organization of
African Unity thé notions of early warning and conflict prevention are regularly
articulated with regard to its new strategy and institutional approach towards conflicts.
However, thé OAU's new policies and procédures in this area were essentially meant to
speed up its reaction to conflicts which hâve already erupted into violence. This
improvement in its response capacity was vital, since, for years, thé organization's
responses to conflicts were slow in coming or did not corne at ail. Thus, although this
book employs thé concepts of early warning and conflict prevention in the context of
both éruption and escalation of violence, it is clear that in the case of the OAU, as well
as several other organizations, the use of other terminology would actually be more
appropriate: for example, conflict resolution or conflict management - the latter
referring to Containment or réduction of violent conflict rather than its prevention as
such. Nevertheless, it must be realized that the distinction between conflict resol-
ution/management and conflict prevention is not clear-cut, but that these involve
instruments that are part of a continuüm of activities which are undertaken at different
points of the life cycle of a conflict.
Early Waming Systems in Practice
While early warning and conflict prevention are therefore rarely defined, some excep-
tions can be noted. For example, the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minor-
ities defined early warning as an instrument that should
provide the relevant CSCE bodies with information about escalatory developments, be they slow
and graduai or quick and sudden, far enough in advance in order for them to react timely and
effectively, if possible still leaving them time to employ préventive diplomacy and other non-
coercive and non-military préventive measures.1
Yet fully-fledged early warning Systems, based on theoretical models of systematic
collection and analysis of indicators, are few and far between. As pointed out in the next
chapter, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the United Nations operate
certain early warning Systems, but in the case of the UN efforts at collection and
analysis of indicators became scattered across the Secrétariat's departments after the
démise of ORCI. Thus, in 1994 Dedring concluded that UN practice with regard to
early warning was characterized by incomplete designs, half measures and a lack of
conceptual rigour.2 The implications of the participation of various institutions and
agencies, each with their own préoccupations, agendas and perceptions, for the
opération of an early warning System are discussed in chapter 4.
Nevertheless, as shown in chapters 3 and 7, since 1994 there has been some
streamlining of UN activities with regard to the processing, analysis and sharing of
early warning signais among the major organs of the Secrétariat. Moreover, in a more
genera! way the UN's capacities at fact-finding have increased over the years. This has
relevance for any potential conflict préventive stratégies, most notably for regional
organizations - like in Africa - whose resources for developing early warning Systems
are limited.
In a less conventional way the OSCE possesses an early warning capability in the
guise of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. OSCE documents stipulate
1 M. van der Stoel, 'Key-Note Speech to the Seminar on Early Warning and Préventive Diplomacy,
Warsaw, 19-21 January 1994', in CSCE ODIHRBulletin, 1994, no. 2, p. 8.
2 J. Dedring, 'Early Warning and the United Nations', in The Journal of Ethno-Development, 1994,
no. l,p. 104.
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that the Commissioner will provide early warning and, as appropriate, early action at
the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which
have not yet developed beyond the early warning stage, but, in the judgement of the
High Commissioner, have the potential to develop into a conflict.
Por the OSCE hè represents an important means for the gathering of information
and the identification of conflict. His mandate involves two principal functions:
persuading parties to seek accommodation and, if violence is imminent, attempting to
de-escalate. In the second phase bis so-called 'trip-wire' function is activated: if hè
concludes that there is prima facie risk that a situation will lead to a conflict hè may
issue a formal 'early warning' to the Senior Council of the OSCE, which will discuss it
at its next meeting. The Commissioner may then ask the Council to allow him to enter
into further contact with the parties, which OSCE documents call 'early action'. If, after
such further consultations, he concludes that the situation will escalate or develop
beyond a level that hè is able to cope with, hè may transfer the case to the Council.3
While the Commissioner has as yet never issued a formal early warning nor
engaged in formal early action, these provisions must not be confused with the Commis-
sioner's real early waming function: this consists of the continuous collecting of
information, the following and assessing of events and, if need be, engaging in consul-
tations with the parties with the object to promote dialogue, which generally takes place
at a stage before formal early warnings are issued to the OSCE's Senior Council. Most
observers agrée that the High Commissioner constitutes a relatively successful example
of early warning. For example, his work in the Baltic countries is a case in point when
assessing his abilities to help de-escalate disputes between ethnie or cultural communi-
ties.4 However, in the exécution of his mandate he is hampered by limited resources and
this OSCE functionary does not, of course, represent a genuine early warning 'system'
as prescribed in théories on early warning. Moreover, the practical importance of the
Commissioner in terms of early warning of conflicts is limited by the narrow focus on
inter-ethnic relations as a potential source of violence.
The Organization of American States (OAS) does not have a structure that can be
considered as anything approaching an early warning system. Indeed, conflict preven-
tion has so far hardly figured, or not at all, among the Organization's policy objectives.
Similarly, while the OAU has made conflict prevention a formal policy goal and the
capacity of its Secrétariat for monitoring conflicts has undergone limited improvement,
it would go too f ar to speak about an early warning system. Until now the Secrétariat's
resource base has been too precarious while the number of staff involved is, as yet,
minimal. While there are ideas within the Economie Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) for a 'conflict observatory', here one cannot yet speak of any early warning
system either. The Organization has, until now, focused solely on the existing (rather
than potential) conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The institutional structure of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) was for long kept deliberately
lean, while plans for an enhanced rôle in the management, resolution and prevention of
Southern African conflicts are relatively recent. During the early 1990s plans were in
this respect considered for a SADC security committee, which would process informa-
tion on military matters and security threats and share data on these issues among
experts. Clearly, this would go towards what might be called an early warning structure
- and, indeed, this concept was articulated when plans for the security committee were
discussed. When the committee was formally established in 1996 under the name of
'Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security', one of its principal objectives was stated to
be the protection of Southern Africa's peoples against instability arising from the
breakdown of law and order. Coopération in regional security and defence through
conflict prevention, management and resolution became an official goal of the Organ in
question, while it was directed to use préventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the
région within and between member states, among others by developing an early
warning system and through the promotion of democratie institutions and the observ-
ance of human rights. Finally, the Secrétariat of the Association of South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) lacks a significant personnel base that could (help) operate an early
warning system. Moreover, while ASEAN has a mechanism for the prevention of
environmental problems, its emphasis on national sovereignty and non-intervention
make an extension to the area of conflicts difficult.5
Conflict Prevention; Official Policies versus the Practice
Apart from the fact that there are few genuine early warning Systems around, inter-
governmental organizations can, more generally, boast very little concrete action or
success with regard to the prevention or escalation of conflicts. It seldom happens that
they are activated before the outbreak of violence, although the préventive deployment
of UN troops in Macedonia represents a celebrated exception. Interestingly, the
décision to send contingents to this former Yugoslav republic was taken with a clearly
preventative goal in mind.6
However, it is the OSCE which, with its elaborate system of consultations and
other instruments, cornes closest to realizing a conflict préventive strategy. Yet even if
3 The Challenges of Change. Helsinki Summit Déclaration and Décisions, ch. H, sections 13-20,
Helsinki, 10 July 1992.
4 See R. Zaagman, ' Conflictvoorkoming in Europa: De Hoge Commissaris inzake Minderheden van de
CVSE',inAtlantisch Perspectief, 1993,no.6,pp. 17-19.
5 The data on ASEAN in this chapter are drawn from the contribution by Jurjen van der Vlugt in the
Clingendael Occasional Paper 'Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in the Political Practice of
International Organizations' (TheHague, 1996).
6 See for example J. Dedring, 'The Security Council in Préventive Action' ; paper presented to the 1997
Executive Seminar of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University -
Preventing Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges, Krusenberg, 20-22 August 1997.
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it manages to clear up misunderstandings, contain disputes or prevent the éruption of
violence, practice points at numerous conflicts in which the OSCE was unable to
prevent large-scale hostilities or in which it did not come up with a quick response or
any (adequate) response at all. The conflicts in former Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh
and Chechnya illustrate its inability to prevent violence, while the situation in several
central Asian republics and the Kurdish région of Turkey bears witness of the absence
of any (swift and adequate) response. The same is true for the OSCE's response to the
crisis in Kosovo, even though this région was potentially more sensitive to the desta-
bilizing effects of the civil war in Yugoslavia than Macedonia.7
The civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia were first handled by European institutions.
As it was only after the situation had deteriorated that the UN was called in, one cannot
really blame the world body for responding only once violence had spread. Moreover,
the UN can boast the préventive deployment of troops in Macedonia, which at least
helped to contain the conflicts geographically. In 1996-1997 a multinational protection
force, mandated by the UN Security Council,8 abated escalating civil strife in Albania.
This was done with limited success, although rather belatedly and thus not without the
considérable expenses incurred by military intervention - which the philosophy behind
early warning and conflict prevention seeks to avert ui the first place.9 The UN's
intensive efforts to realize peace settlements in Mozambique and Cambodia are other
cases that, to a greater or lesser extent, represent exercises in the prevention of future
violent conflict, i.e. after the conclusion of a preceding phase of fighting. However,
these examples are the exception rather than the rule, while subséquent developments in
Cambodia show how fragile UN-brokered peace agreements aimed at ending complex,
protracted civil wars can be.10
The UN's approach towards the unfolding events in Somalia (1988-1992),
Rwanda (1992-1994) and Zaire (1996-1997) seems to be more typical of actual trends:
responses that involved too little and came too late. The catastrophic course that
American and UN intervention took in Somalia, though afterwards thoroughly analysed
in a UN-sponsored study to learn lessons for the future,11 had in this respect a negative
10
11
As the tiny Serbian Community in Macedonia made this territory less important in the expansionist
designs of the rulers in Serbia proper. This point is aptly observed by Dedring, 'Security Council in
Action', p. 13.
See Security Council Resolution S/RES/1101 (1997), 28 March 1997.
See Z. Racsmany, 'Too Little, Too Late: The Failure of Conflict Prévention in Albania'; paper
presented to the 1997 Executive Seminar of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of
Uppsala University - Preventing Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges, Krusenberg, 20-22
August 1997.
Some interesting insights in internationally sponsored 'peace processes' can be found in S.J. Stedman,
'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes', in International Security, vol. 22, no. 2, fall 1997, pp. 5-53.
See Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia, April
1992 - March 1995 (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Germany; Life and Peace Institute, Sweden; and
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effect on the political will of Western countries to prevent or de-escalate complex
conflict situations - especially if it concerned domestic conflicts in countries where
Western interests are marginal.
The record of other inter-governmental organizations is equally modest, if not
disappointing. Since the end of the Cold War the Organization of American States has
been active in ways that are only indirectly relevant in terms of conflict prevention.
Thus its so-called 'Santiago mechanism' aims at a swift collective response to coup-
makers, who are immediately suspended from OAS membership. As this approach
involves a quickened response to an existing domestic dispute or conflict with the
objective of averting at least its further escalation, this OAS instrument can be said to
go in the same direction as a genuine strategy of conflict prevention.
Nevertheless, recent years point to an ambivalent record with regard to the new
OAS commitment to the maintenance of democratie governments - and thus throw into
doubt its willingness to engage in activities aimed at preventing escalation of domestic
conflicts as a result of coups d'état. OAS pressure on usurpers of power in Guatemala
helped domestic forces in that country to withstand the army, with the result that the
latter's coup attempt collapsed in a matter of days. Yet developments in Peru and Haiti
did not lead to an equally forceful stand by the OAS. Thus when President Fujimori of
Peru arrogated considérable powers to himself, the OAS did not attempt to get back to
the status quo ante. Admittedly, it called on members to eut aid to Peru, threatened the
imposition of other sanctions and conferred with Fujimori. Yet in the end it asked him
to achieve his objective by way of constitutional reform that should be approved in
OAS-monitored élections. Although the constituent congress formed for this purpose
was boycotted by the largest opposition parties and the subséquent approval of Fuji-
mori's reforms by way of a plébiscite hardly amounted to respect for the democratie
process, the OAS restored Peru to its former status in the organization. US concern for
Peru's stability and its support for American anti-drugs efforts were crucialhere.12
Similarly, the OAS was unable to force the Haitian military to give back power to
President Aristide. It is true that the OAS quickly condemned the coup of General
Cédras, instituted a trade embargo and began consultations with the Haitian leader.
However, at the time both the Bush administration and several Latin American
countries opposed stronger measures when it became clear that Cédras would not be
moved. A majority of Latin American states also refused to refer the matter to the UN
Security Council on the grounds that the situation in Haiti did not constitute a threat to
international peace and security. In the end it was the Clinton administration that
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in collaboration with the Lessons-Learned Unit of the UN
Department of Peace Keeping Opérations: no pi., December 1995).
12 H. Munoz, 'A New OAS for the New Times', in A.F. Lowenthal and G.F. Treverton (eds), Latin
America in a New World (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford, 1994), ch. 10 and R.J. Bloomfield,
'Making the Western Hémisphère Safe for Democracy? The OAS Defense-of-Democracy Regime',
in The Washington Quarterly, spring 1994, pp. 157-69.
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stepped in to remove the Haitian military, with a subséquent rôle for the UN but very
littlefortheOAStodo.13
One should in this respect not over-estimate thé cornmitment of certain Latin
American countries, or of thé United States for that matter, to a compulsory defence of
démocratie standards through thé OAS. The idea for thé. Santiago mechanism was
cherished by thé United States, Venezuela and Chile and got the backing of Argentina
and some Caribbean and other member states. However, others, such as Mexico, Brazil
and Colombia, were opposed to it. The problem is that, judging from US action against
Panama's Noriega, American intervention is still a living reality, as is the désire of
many Latin American countries to avoid such eventuality.14 This configuration of
interests will obviously hinder any significant évolution of a conflict préventive
mandate and rôle for thé OAS.
The same conclusions might be drawn for Africa's inter-governmental institutions,
though for opposite reasons. Despite the O AU's lip-service to conflict prevention and
its modest efforts to contribute to peaceful change in member states, thé organization is
usually overtaken by events of violence: with its meagre resources and limited staffing
available for conflict monitoring it can only respond, though admittedly more swiftly
than in the past, to conflicts that hâve already erapted into violence. Moreover, with thé
prevalence of domestic conflicts on thé African continent this means that, in practice, it
limits itself to addressing thé more serious conflagrations. While it is true that OAU
envoys and Secrétariat personnel have, since the end of the Cold War, been active in
mediating in a variety of conflicts - ranging from thé Nigeria-Cameroon conflict over
the Bakasi peninsula, the civil war in Congo-Brazzaville to the separatist troubles on
the Comoros - the organization has focused most of its efforts on thé civil wars in
Rwanda and Burundi. The Secretary-General kept a painfully low profile vis-à-vis thé
collapse of Somalia, while intervention in thé civil wars in Libéria and Sierra Leone was
in effect left to thé Economie Community of West African States. One can argue that
because of thé increase in the O AU's response capacity and its swifter reaction to
conflicts as compared to thé Cold War period, thé changes in thé organization's
strategy towards conflicts go at least in thé direction pointed out by the protagonists of
prévention. However, as is the case in the OSCE, thé OAU faces a structural lack of
leadership, which, together with thé defence of state sovereignty by African state elites,
obstructs the development of a significant rôle in prévention of conflicts ,15
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13 Bloomfield, 'Making thé Western Hémisphère Safe for Democracy' and M. Fortmann and J.Ph.
Thérien, 'L'Organisation des Etats américains: un système de coopération régionale en transition', in
Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, summer 1994, pp. 187-201.
14 See Bloomfield, 'Making thé Western Hémisphère Safe for Democracy'.
15 See for an analysis of the OAU' s past rôle in conflict médiation and thé changes effected in this respect
since thé early 1990s K. van Walraven, Dreams of Power: The Rôle ofthe Organization of African
Unity in the Politics ofAJrica 1963-1993 (Aldershot, 1998).
Similarly, it was stated above that thé emphasis in ASEAN on national sovereignty and
non-interférence will make it difficult to develop conflict prevention as a significant
cornerstone of the organization's policies. ECOWAS has so far only focused on the
existing conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In practice conflict prevention does not
figure among the organization's (predominantly economie) policies and mandates.
Finally, as shown in chapter 8, in SADC there have been certain developments regard-
ing the évolution of collective norms and actual cases of conflict médiation and
prevention that seem to mark it out from the examples set by the OAU and ECOWAS.
However, as witnessed by the 1997 dispute between Zimbabwe and South Africa over
the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, there is also a problem of leadership in
SADC - although in this case the issue is that there might be, as in the context of the
Organization of American States, too much of it: South Africa's dominant position in
the Southern African région is at the same time a sine qua non for a forceful SADC
posture on conflicts and a potential obstacle to its évolution because of fears or
resentment that the smaller member states may harbour about their bigger neighbour.
Thus, from the start, this problem plagued the Nigeria-dominated intervention of
ECOWAS in Liberia.
When Do International Organizations Respond? Signals of Conflict and
Concepts of Security
In so far as the above-mentioned organizations have developed ideas on conflict
préventive stratégies, they tend to have divergent views on what kind of events or
developments are supposed to be signais of possibly violent conflict. This has a direct
bearing on their décision to respond or not to respond to certain developments. More-
over, it strongly affects the way in which they will react to a particular conflict.
The OSCE regards a broad range of developments as possible causes' of conflict.
These can be roughly divided in signais that emanate from the military sphère and
signais in the so-called 'human dimension'. Those from the military sphère usually
pertain to potential inter-state disputes and may involve unusual troop movements,
hazardous military incidents and possible misunderstandings resulting from these
events. Signals of potential conflict in the human dimension are often considered as
possible causes of domestic strife. One should think here of violations of human rights,
fundamental freedoms, democracy, the rule of law and humanitarian principles.
While problems related to economie transition and development are understated as
signais of potential conflict, it is inter-ethnic tension that is seen as a particularly
important signal of impending trouble. OSCE documents do not explain how exactly
inter-ethnic tension may generale (violent) conflict. However, the first High Commis-
sioner has argued that, while 'ethnie relationships ... often have a centuries-old history,
such conflicts very often have more immédiate political causes'. In this respect he refers
to the manipulation by politicians of psychological uncertainties and material difficul-
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ties generaled by the problems of economie transition.16 OSCE documents do not define
what is meant by a 'national minority'. It is often used in a broad way to discuss inter-
ethnic and inter-religious ties. Yet, as complaints by individual members of rninorities
have been excluded from the High Commissioner's mandate, it is clear that it is
problems concerning an entire minority as such that are regarded as a potential source
of conflict. The High Commissioner is also not allowed to concern himself with
problems surrounding rninorities if acts of terrorism are involved. This has, however,
more to do with résistance by member states to OSCE concern with domestic security
problems than with any contention that inter-ethnic tensions, marked by terrorist acts,
could not be regarded as a signal of potentially escalating violence.17
The High Commissioner has, among others, concerned himself with problems
concerning Russian rninorities in the Baltic states, especially Latvia and Estonia; the
problems of Slovak and Hungarian rninorities in Hungary and Slovakia; minorities in
Macedonia, Albania, Romania, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan; and the problems
surrounding the Roma group of Gypsies in Europe. From some of the suggestions he
has made to improve inter-ethnic ties in these cases, one may infer that lack of com-
munication between government and minority is considered to be one aspect of the
nature of the problems concerning minorities. Others are exclusion from public life,
forced assimilation and lack of linguistic facilities, such as language éducation and
broadcasting.18
In the United Nations there is an equally large array of events and developments
that are considered as potential sources of violent conflict, whether inter-state or
domestic. The list of those perceived signais is, however, less well explicated. Boutros-
Ghali's An Agenda for Peace19 vaguely speaks of 'political developments', 'social and
economie trends' and 'political indicators'. The time at which these have to be brought
before UN organs is not made clear either, although this should be done 'at the earliest
possible stage' and the whole idea underlying the Secretary-General's report is that it
should be done before the éruption of violence. Naturally, some of the UN' s specialized
agencies such as the FAO and UNHCR operate early warning models that are centred
around more spécifie indicators, such as refugee flows, failed harvests or drought.
In the O AS considérable emphasis is put on coups d'état, although these are
interpreted as threats to hemispheric security rather than as signais of future potential
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16 M. van der Stoel, 'The Rôle of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in CSCE
Conflict Prévention', in Studia Diplomatica, 1994, no. 4, p. 62.
17 H. Zaal, 'The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities', in Helsinki Monitor, 1992, no. 4,
pp. 34-36.
18 M. van der Stoel, 'Conflictvoorkoming in Europa: De Rol van de Hoge Commissaris van de CVSE
inzake Minderheden', in Internationale Spectator, 1994,pp. 105-106.
19 B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Préventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peacekeeping.
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the
Security Council on 31 January 1992 (United Nations: New York, 1992).
conflict in a particular country. There is hardly any emphasis on tensions emanating
from economie diffïculties.
The OAU does not seem to distinguish in, or to emphasize particular, events or
developments as signais of potential conflicts, whether inter-state or domestic.
However, in practice the organization has invested a lot of energy in trying to médiate in
the conflicts of the Great Lakes, something which may be related to the Tanzanian
origins of Secretary-General Salim. As ECOWAS has so far focused exclusively on the
conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, not much can be said about its listing of signais, if
there is any. Evidence on SADC and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Develop-
ment (IGAD) is also inconclusive, although SADC has focused its attention on various
- even potential - conflicts in the Southern African région, especially domestic ones.
With minorities and human rights issues excluded from ASEAN's brief, its perception
of signais relates predominantly to the military sphère and the area of inter-state
conflict. However, ASEAN is also concerned with environmental problems as a source
of potential inter-state tensions.
The related concepts of security tend to vary as well. The one employed in the
OSCE is very broad indeed and encompasses just about any aspect of domestic political
and socio-économie conditions, as well as the various dimensions of inter-state
relations. The Helsinki Summit Déclaration of 1992 states that the OSCE' s approach to
conflict is based on the 'comprehensive concept of security as initiated in the Final
Act', adopted in Helsinki in 1975. It argues that this concept relates the maintenance of
peace to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to economie
and environmental solidarity and coopération. The protection and promotion of human
rights and the strengthening of democratie institutions are seen as the 'vital basis' for
comprehensive security. The underlying idea is that violations of human rights will
often lead to tensions and conflicts inside states and sometimes to problems and
disputes between states. Dictatorially governed countries are more likely to pursue
aggressive policies than democratically controlled governments.20
The security concept of the United Nations has traditionally focused on threats to
international peace and security, although since the end of the Cold War it has
increasingly shifted to include developments in domestic contexts. The example of UN
intervention in Somalia is pertinent hère. Moreover, the world body is active in various
dimensions of human life, something that contributes to a broad view on security.
The security concept of the OAS has also steadily widened. Although it is not as
comprehensive as the one employed in the OSCE, it now includes the values of
democratie government and human rights. The Central American peace accords of the
late 1980s began the extension of the security concept as used in the Western hémi-
sphère. They involved agreements on free élections, confidence-building measures,
20 M. van der Stoel, 'Conflicten voorkomen en bouwen aan de vrede: een uitdaging voor de cvse', in
NA VO Kroniek, August 1994, pp. 7-12.
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disarmament and international monitoring of these steps. By this they moved away
from the old regime-oriented approach to security to include the values of democratiz-
ation and human rights so as to create viable regional peace settlements. In the process,
these agreements also emphasized the link between military security and the state of
domestic socio-political configurations in the région.21
Whether the example of the OSCE formed a source of inspiration is not sure. The
référence to 'confidence-building measures' might possibly suggest this, although the
sources make no explicit mention of OSCE practice. In contrast, one can with certainty
point to spécifie historical roots in the Americas themselves, when attempting to
explain the évolution towards the more comprehensive security concept. Thus, the OAS
Charter itself already contains références to the importance of human rights and
'représentative democracy', as well as to an Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights. Later on this was elaborated in a convention for the protection of human rights
and fundamental liberties. With the transition towards civilian democratie Systems and
the end of the Cold War, the context of this human rights system changed. The struggle
against communism could no longer be used to excuse human rights violations.
Moreover, with the émergence of civilian governments came closer convergence among
Latin American elites on the importance of democratie values and human rights. The
result was that the OAS became more interventionist in this field, tying these issues to
its concept of security. However, the sources do not explicitly link the stronger empha-
sis on human rights and democracy to the OAS mandate of médiation in conflicts, even
if the rôle of the OAS in organizing and/or monitoring élections in countries like
Nicaragua, Haiti, Surinam and Peru at least implies such a link.22
Similarly, the security concept of the OAU23 has also broadened as a result of the
arrogation of domestic conflicts to its area of compétence (1990). In the past the
organization could only concern itself with inter-state conflicts, or domestic ones which
were marked by substantial extra-African involvement or which otherwise had
developed implications for the state of inter-African relations. Yet the OAU may now
also be activated with regard to domestic conflicts - whether or not these carry certain
international repercussions. For example, humanitarian concerns as such may also be
sufficient grounds for some kind of OAU response to violent developments inside
member states.
Even if it is true that the organization does not have a blanket right of intervention
and needs, for instance, the consent or coopération of the member state concerned when
it wishes to médiate, dispatch observers or send envoys, the 1993 Cairo summit gave it
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21 S.N. MacFarlane and T.G. Weiss, 'The United Kations, regional organisations and human security:
building theory in Central America', in Third World Quarterly, 1994, pp. 277-95.
22 See for OAS concern with human rights also H.G. Espiell, 'The Organization of American States
(OAS)', in K. Vasak and P. Alston (eds), The International Dimensions of Human Rights, vol. 2
(Westport, 1982), pp. 543-69.
23 The data on the OAU are drawn from Van Walraven, Dreams of Power.
the right to intervene in situations characterized by a total breakdown in order and
massive human suffering. The Secretary-General, moreover, has consistently empha-
sized the importance of democratie change in member states, peaceful processes of
transition and a potential rôle in this for the OAU. All this points to a concept of
security that has considerably broadened as compared to the Cold War era. Neverthe-
less, while the organization has been involved in the monitoring of élections and
national constitutional conferences, in the practice of dispute settlement its concept of
security is still far from comprehensive: the OAU focuses, and its activation is largely
dependent on, conflicts that have already entered a stage of (escalating) violence; there
is little room to concentrate on, say, the negative and preliminary developments in the
human rights situation of a member state where there is as yet no (large-scale) violence.
Similarly, since the attention of ECOWAS has until now been exclusively directed
at the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, its security concept is, in practice,
geographically limited. This may, of course, change as the organization's security rôle
develops, although the institutions projected for the opération of its Defence Protocol
were never put in place and its rôle in the Liberian conflict has not been free from
controversy.24 In any case, its security concept as yet does not encompass more than the
military dimensions of security and the threats to security.
The concept of security that is at present emerging inside SADC is still unclear,
although it does involve both domestic and inter-state developments. Moreover, the
organization is slowly developing a norm-setting rôle for itself in the Southern African
région with regard to some minimal qualitative parameters for domestic governance. K"
this trend is to continue it could lead to the évolution of a comprehensive security
concept with a humanitarian dimension25 comparable to that of the OSCE. This would
set SADC apart from the other inter-African institutions.
Evidence on the security concept of IGAD is as yet insufficient for any firm
conclusions. In 1993 IGAD widened its mandate to concern itself with the manage-
ment, if not prevention, of conflicts. It has thus mediated in disputes between Ethiopia
and Somalia and in the Somali and Sudanese civil wars. With regard to the latter
conflict it was able, in the course of 1995, to realize a temporary cease-fire between the
warring parties. However, while IGAD enjoys the fïnancial and political support of
certain Western countries, especially the United States and the Netherlands, bad
24 See Y. Gershoni, 'From ECOWAS to ECOMOG: The Liberian Crisis and the Struggle for Political
Hegemony in West Africa', in Liberian Studies Journal, 1993, no. l, pp. 21-43; the special issue of
Issue: A Journal of Opinion, 1993, nos. 1-2; and E.J. Inegbedion, 'ECOMOG in Comparative
Perspective', in T.M. Shaw and J.E. Okolo (eds), The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in
£COWAS(Basingstoke and London, 1994),ch. 12.
25 The formulation of such a security concept is strongly pleaded by K. Booth and P. Vale, 'Security in
Southern Africa; After Apartheid, Beyond Realism', in International Affairs, 1995, pp. 285-304.
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relations between Sudan on the one hand and other IGAD members on the other hinder
its development as the région's principal security structure.26
Finally, the security concept of ASEAN is rather broad. Although the organization
was never meant to be a military alliance, the management of security has tumed out to
be a major aspect of its évolution. It should in this respect not be forgotten, however,
that ASEAN is not allowed by its member states to deal with human rights and
minorities issues. Thus, while its security concept also covers environmental dégrada-
tion, illegal immigration and natural resources, besides military aspects, this makes
ASEAN's focus on security more narrow. Nevertheless, through the ASEAN Regional
Forum the geographical scope of its security concept has expanded considerably.27
Thus, each inter-governmental organization appears to have its own approach in
terms of security concepts and its own perspective on the variables that it regards as
signais of potentially violent conflict. It seems that these concepts and signais, as well
as the priority attributed to mem, are for the most part determined by the spécifie
features and peculiarities of the régions concerned. There are, of course, similarities,
which are essentially the result of global developments of the post-Cold War era which
to a greater or lesser extent have confronted every région or continent: the end of
interférence by the superpowers in zones of conflict; the new mandates for international
organizations to fill the vacuüm they left behind; the economie marginalization of
régions such as Africa; and the need to retain access to foreign aid - all these have led to
greater demands being made on, and conditions being set for, internationally acceptable
behaviour of governments. In this context international organizations must concentrate
on new dimensions and aspects of violent conflicts and employ new security concepts
that take into account the nature and quality of the political system in their member
states. The example of the OSCE may have inspired some of the ideas on the manage-
ment or prevention of conflicts that circulate in other organizations, as well as some of
the measures that have in this respect been formulated. Yet évidence for this is incon-
clusive and remains limited to références to 'confidence-building measures' or
organization-controlled 'management of change'.
Responses to (Potential) Violence: Procedures and Institutional Arrangements
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
One can observe both similarities and différences in the way international organizations
attempt to process and respond to signais of conflicts, whether potential or existing. In
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the OSCE emphasis is put on the rôle of member states themselves activating certain
mechanisms. The so-called Berlin, Valletta, Vienna and Moscow mechanisms, as well
as the one on 'unusual military activities', are pertinent here.
The 'Mechanism for Consultation and Coopération with Regard to Emergency
Situations', otherwise known as the Berlin Mechanism, is applicable in the whole area
of OSCE activity and is thus in principle concerned with various signais of potential
conflict. It may be invoked in case of 'a serious emergency situation which may arise
f rom a violation of one of the Principles of the Final Act or as a result of major disrup-
tions endangering peace, security or stability',28 It involves two phases. A state may
seek clarification from another country when it considers that an emergency situation is
developing. The requested information must be provided within two days and will also
be transmitted to other OSCE states. If the problem is not solved, the initiating state
may, with the agreement of twelve other countries, call an emergency session of the
OSCE's Senior Council, which must be held within two or three days. The Senior
Council may convene a meeting of the Ministerial Council of the OSCE or arrive at its
own recommendations or conclusions.29
The so-called Valletta Mechanism is not a procedure for the prevention of conflict
but one for the settlement of conflicts that have already broken out. It may be applied in
any conflict between member states, except those that - in the opinion of the state
concerned - involve issues of territorial integrity, national defence or sovereignty. The
Mechanism provides for the mandatory involvement of a third party. To this purpose
one or more independent members may be selected from a resource list of experts.
Although the Mechanism has never been used it was later strengthened with a pro-
cedure by which the Ministerial Council or Senior Council may direct disputants to seek
conciliation. Such a décision may be taken without their consent ('consensus minus
two').30
The 'Mechanism for Consultation and Coopération as Regards Unusual Military
Activities' stipulâtes that states will consult each other on any unusual and unscheduled
activities of their military forces outside their normal peacetime locations, which are
militarily significant and about which a participating state expresses its security
concern. Within two days a government must provide an answer to questions pertaining
to such activities. Any state may request such clarification and request bilatéral
meetings or meetings of thé OSCE as such to résolve thé issue. Thèse meetings must
take place within forty-eight hours. The mechanism was activated three times in thé
early stages of the Yugoslav crisis, where it helped to de-escalate tensions between
Belgrade and Italy and Austria with regard to their (then) common border régions.
26 The data on IGAD were drawn in part from internai records of thé Netherlands' foreign ministry. The
above does not, however, necessarily reflect the views of the Netherlands government.
27 See note 5 above.
28 Quoted in A. Bloed, 'Two Decades of the CSCE Process: From Confrontation to Coopération', in A.
Bloed (ed.), The Conference on Security and Coopération in Europe: Analysis and Basic
Documents, 1972-1993 (Dordrecht, Boston and London, 1993), p. 31.
29 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
30 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
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States must also cooperate with each other in the area of hazardous incidents of a
military nature, by reporting and clarifying what has happened.31
The mechanisms of the human dimension are a collection of procedures that aim at
making states engage in dialogue, at collecting information and at finding solutions for
problems related to human rights in their widest scope. Like the Berlin procédure they
entail a phased approach, from clarification to consultation and, finally, to meetings of
OSCE organs. Thèse may then, for example, décide to send fact-finding missions. The
most général procédures are thé so-called Vienna and Moscow mechanisms. The fïrst
stipulâtes that states provide information on matters relating to thé human dimension
within ten days of a request to that effect from another government. It may lead to a
bilatéral meeting to discuss the matter and thé other OSCE states may be informed of
thèse developments. This may also be done at meetings of the Senior Council. The
Moscow procédure suppléments this by making it possible to dispatch independent
experts to assess thé relevant situation. A state may initiale thé establishment of such a
mission even against thé will of thé government involved, if it obtains support from five
other countries. This créâtes thé possibility for independent assessment of situations
that carry the seeds of conflict. Moreover, the Moscow mechanism also allows thé
Senior Council to establish a mission of independent experts or rapporteurs; thé
voluntary invitation by a state of such experts; and thé appointment of rapporteurs in
case of a 'particularly serious threat' to thé human dimension régulations. This last
opportunity must concern cases of massive and gross violations. In such cases thé
mission may be established with thé support of ten states and it can also be sent against
thé will of the government concerned.32
Apart from the High Commissioner on National Minorities discussed earlier, thé
OSCE has two other instruments which hâve some relevance with regard to responding
to potential or actual conflict, if only indirectly. So-called missions of long duration are
used to address causes of conflict, while they are also engaged in early warning of
impending violence. They are established by thé Senior Council and can only function
with thé consent of the state involved. While short-term missions are usually estab-
lished on an ad hoc basis and restrict themselves to fact-finding and analysis, long-term
missions aim at softening or resolving conflicts by offering their médiation; collecting
information; and signalling and preventing escalatory events. If they observe such
developments they can warn other OSCE institutions. One of these is the High Com-
31 Ibid., pp. 32-33; E. Greco, 'The Rôle of the Conflict Prévention Centre in thé Security System of the
CSCE', in Helsinki Monitor, 1994,no. l,pp. 5-15;andH. Vetschera, 'European Conflict Prévention:
The Rôle of the CSCE', in W. Bauwens and L. Reychler (eds), The Art of Conflict Prevention
(London and New York, 1994), eh. 3.
32 Bloed, 'Two Decades of the CSCE Process', pp. 20-21, 31-33 and41-43; R.Zaagman, 'DeCVSE,
"early warning" en preventieve diplomatie', in Transaktie, 1994, no. l, pp 58-75; and W. Hóynk,
'Rôle of the CSCE and Other Organizations in Managing Crisis and Maintaining Peace', in Studio
Diplomatien, 1994, no. 4, pp. 37-49.
missioner, who regularly consults such missions and uses thé information collected by
their members. These missions are active both in the military sphère and in the broad
area of the human dimension.
An example of such a mission is the one that was sent to Kosovo, Vojvodina and
Sandjak in former Yugoslavia, which attempted to encourage dialogue between the
Belgrade government and non-Serbian communities; collect information on the human
rights situation; and establish points of contact. Another long-term mission was
dispatched to Macedonia in order to monitor its border with Serbia. Long-term
missions were also sent to the Baltic states to improve relations between their govern-
ments and the Russian communities; to Moldova, with the objective of establishing a
framework for a durable political solution of the conflict with Russian communities and
formulate proposais for this; to Tadzjikistan to establish dialogue between conflicting
parties, verify their respect for OSCE commitments, assess the military situation and
assist in the formation of legal and democratie structures; and to Georgia-South
Ossetia, with the objective of identifying and eliminating sources of tension, establish-
ing contact with the local population and government, supporting and controlling a
cease-frre and helping in the development of legal and democratie institutions.33
Finally, the OSCE's Office for Democratie Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR) may have some relevance in terms of early warning of violent conflict, as it
faciütates the organization of OSCE vérification meetings with regard to human rights,
collects and provides information on human rights situations, organizes meetings to
review Implementation of OSCE human dimension commitments and participâtes and
undertakes missions to member states.34
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS35
ASEAN also focuses on the rôle of member states themselves in dealing with signais of
impending conflict. However, its préférence for bilateral, informal coopération and the
importance attributed to national sovereignty and non-interference preclude intrusive
consultation procedures. The alliance is thus marked by a général aversion of formal
institutions, which resulted in the Association being managed, from the beginning, by
annual conferences of foreign ministers meeting in the member states on a rotating
33 Zaagman, 'CVSE, "early warning" en preventieve diplomatie'; R. Zaagman, 'Minority Questions,
Human Rights and Regional Instabffity: The Prevention of Conflict', in R.L. Pfaltzgraff and G.R.
Sullivan (eds), Ethnie Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for US Policy and Artny Rôles
and Missions (Washington, 1994), pp. 217-27; H. van Santen and H. Zaal, 'Peacekeeping and the
Rôle of Préventive Diplomacy', in Internationale Spectator, 1993, pp. 646-50; Höynk, 'Rôle of the
CSCE'; and P.W. Gorissen and H.G. Scheltema, 'CVSE, conflictpreventie en crisisbeheersing: Een
tussenstand', in Militaire Spectator, 1994, no. 4, pp. 171 -77.
34 The Challenges of Change: Helsinki Sumrnit Déclaration and Décisions, ch. VI.
35 See note 5 above.
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basis. A small général secrétariat was established only later. This means that there is no
viable central institution necessary for the collection and processing of conflict signais.
While the Treaty of Amity and Coopération of 1976 went some way towards institu-
tionalizing ASEAN's rôle in the resolution of conflicts, its relevant procedures are
dependent on a 'High Council'. Although this organ was to be purely inter-government-
al in structure it was, in fact, never established.
UNITED NATIONS
In the UN the processing of signais is mainly done through the work of the Secretary-
General and his Secrétariat, with the Security Council as the organ responsible for
generating concrete action to be taken on the basis of those signais. The Secretary-
General's rôle in processing signais of impending or actual conflict and issuing
warnings of their éruption or escalation is essentially a part of his political mandate as
ingrained in article 99 of the Charter. Thus, the chief of the Secrétariat is supposed to
bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that may threaten the mainten-
ance of international peace and security. The extension of the UN's security concept to
include also developments at the sub-state level made the collection and analysis of data
on domestic conflicts, as well as the exécution of an early warning function based on
these data, a natural element in the Secretary-General's mandate.36 In this respect it is
relevant to note that, already during the 1980s, the UN's rôle and capacity in fact-
finding began to grow considerably. As discussed further in chapters 3 and 7 there was
some streamh'ning of fact-fmding with the establishment, in 1987, of the Office for
Research and Collection of Information (ORCI). Although this organ was later
abolished by Boutros-Ghali and the collection and analysis of conflict signais therefore
continued to be scattered across several UN organs, the world body's fact-finding rôle
remained of gréât importance. Thus, by 1993 the Secretary-General could observe that
in the preceding year more fact-fmding missions had taken place man in any previous
period.37
One may even conclude that, in so far as one can speak of a préventive approach to
conflicts in the United Nations, its institutional manifestation should be sought
principally in the resources, procedures and organs involved in collecting, analysing
and processing information on tensions and conflicts. This work is without comparison
in other organizations, although perhaps with the exception of the OSCE. This
conclusion does not take into account, however, the difficulties inherent in the decen-
tralized nature of the UN's approach to early warning.38 Nevertheless, even though the
UN's response to impending conflicts leaves at present much to be desired, the end of
the Cold War lifted the Security Council's paralysis - at least in principle - and
enhanced its capacity to process signais into concrete préventive or Containment action.
ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES
While in the UN action on early warning signais is supposed to be taken by the Security
Council, in the OAS there is more than one institutional arrangement for producing a
response to (impending or existing) violent conflict. A Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs may be held when a member state makes a request to that
effect to the Permanent Council of the OAS, which décides on this by simple majority.
The Meeting of Consultation may be held to consider any problems of an urgent nature
and of common interest to the American states or to tackle developments as f oreseen in
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947. This so-called 'Rio
Treaty' encourages regional settlement of inter-state disputes and to this effect imposes
a consultative mechanism. If an issue falling under the Rio Treaty is at hand - such as
armed aggression involving a member state - the Meeting of Consultation is held
without delay and the foreign ministers may décide on coercive measures such as
sanctions or military action. The meeting may also décide on a course of non-coercive
action, for example by offering médiation services to member states involved in a
dispute.39
In practice it is thé Permanent Council of thé OAS that has often constituted itself
as a Provisional Organ of Consultation, leaving only thé more serious cases to thé
ministerial meeting as such. Composed of member state représentatives with the rank
of ambassador, thé Council acts as thé executive organ of the OAS and meets twice a
month at thé headquarters of thé organization in Washington. lts most important task
involves thé maintenance of peaceful relations between member states and aiding them
in finding a peaceful settlement to their disputes. To this purpose it is assisted by an
Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement, made up of représentatives of five
countries elected on the basis of partial annual rotation. In offering their mediatory
services and good offices, both Committee and Council are dépendent on thé consent of
thé parties to thé dispute.40
36 See also Dedring, 'The Security Council in Préventive Action'.
37 See B. Boutros-Ghali, 'An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later', in Orbis, summer 1993, pp. 323-32.
38 Seechapter4.
39 E. Fischlowitz, 'The OAS in the Inter-American Political System', in C. A. Astiz (ed.), Latin American
International Politics: Ambitions, Capabilities, and the National Interest of Mexico, Brazil, and
Argentina (Notre Dame and London, 1969), pp. 59-78; and P. van Dijk and C.M. Grossman, 'Het
Inter-Amerikaanse Systeem: Handvest van de OAS, Verdrag van Rio, Pact van Bogota', in H. Meijers
(ed.), Volkenrechtelijke aspecten van Antilliaanse onafhankelijkheid (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1980),
pp. 514-47.
40 Ibid.; F.X. de Lima, Intervention in International Law; with référence to the Organisation of
American States (The Hague, 1971); L.R. Scheman, The Inter-American Dilemma: The Searchfor
Inter-American Coopération at the Centennial of the Inter-American System (New York, Westport
and London, 1988); Y. Salkin, 'Sommeil ou réveil de l'Organisation des Etats américains?', in
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During the 1950s and early 1960s the O AS displayed considérable activity in the
management of existing conflicts. Thus, from 1947 to 1982 OAS mechanisms were
activated on thirty-three occasions, of which twenty-seven before 1970. The Inter-
American Committee on Peaceful Settlement performed an important roie in this area,
offering its good offices to states engaged in a dispute, embarking on fact-finding
missions and, in the more serious crises, threatening the imposition of diplomatic and
economie sanctions. However, no state was condemned as an aggressor and every
culprit was allowed to return to the status quo ante. When the Committee's rôle
diminished in importance member states began to take recourse to ad hoc committees
that were charged by the Permanent Council with similar duties.41
With the onset of détente, the rules of superpower compétition began to shift and
confrontation by way of proxies began to grow significantly. From the early or mid-
1960s there were also growing pressures for internai structural change in Latin
American countries and thus a rise in thé incidence of the more intractable domestic
conflicts. This was accompanied by sharp ideological cleavages, increasing poh'tical
heterogeneity within thé OAS, widening divergence in security concerns and subversion
between member states. United States manipulation of OAS instruments resulted in
more militarized forms of (supposed) multilatéral opérations and often involved thé
imposition of sanctions under thé Rio Treaty. The Cuban crisis of the early 1960s and
the crisis in thé Dominican Republic in 1965 marked this important change. The resuit
was that support for, and confidence in, OAS mechanisms subsided. During the Reagan
years thé OAS became to some extent paralysed.42
From thé mid-1980s, however, new initiatives were launched to enhance thé
relevance of thé OAS in thé management, if not prevention, of conflicts - including
domestic ones. Thus, at its summit in Carthagena in Colombia (1985), the OAS
amended its Charter in order to give its Secretary-General thé formai right of political
initiative. From now on the chief OAS official could draw the attention of the Perma-
nent Council to any question that, in his mind, posed a threat to thé peace and security
of thé hémisphère. The OAS also supported thé Central American peace efforts of the
Contadora Group, which mediated between thé United States and its allies and thé
government of Nicaragua, Cuba and Salvadorian guerrillas. Moreover, thé Secretary-
General himself became more active in thé settlement of disputes as well. Thus, he
participated in thé cease-fire accord reached with thé contras in 1988; assisted in
Défense nationale, April 1992, pp. 109-19; and J.L.Z. Coronado, 'OAS Negotiations', in A.S. Lall
(ed.), Multilateral Negotiation and Mediation (New York, 1985), eh. 2.
41 J. Byron, Regional Security in Latin America and Africa: The OAS and the OAU in the light of
contemporary security issues (PSIS Occasional Papers, Number 1/84: Geneva, 1984) and Fortmann
and Thérien, 'L' Organisation des Etats américains'.
42 Byron, Regional Security in Latin America and Africa and Fortmann and Thérien, 'L'Organisation
des Etats américains'.
establishing a dialogue between the political forces of El Salvador; and together with
the UN helped in monitoring thé électoral process in Nicaragua.43
In this context could be added the establishment of the Santiago mechanism
discussed above. It was concluded that this mechanism amounts to an increase in
response capacity of the OAS and that it thus has some, if indirect, relevance in terms of
conflict prevention. Moreover, introduction and application of the mechanism coniïrms
more clearly, as well as reinforces, the arrogation by the OAS of domestic conflicts to
its area of compétence. However, it was also shown above that the Santiago mechanism
is aimed at the spécifie problems related to coups d'état, and not conflicts in général;
that early warning and conflict prevention as such do not (or hardly) figure in the new
mandate of the organization; and that any évolution towards a more forceful and speedy
processing of, and response to, conflict signais is hindered by the sense of Latin
American unease generated by United States hegemony of their hémisphère.
AFRICA
In the Organization of African Unity44 the processing of signais of (impending and
actual) conflict and the taking of concrete action on the basis of these signais are the
joint responsibility of the functionaries of the Secrétariat and the political organs
representing the member states. Thus, the OAU institutions that concern themselves
with, or are relevant for, conflict settlement are the General Secrétariat; the Council of
Ministers; and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, its chairman and
Bureau. The organ that was originally intended to play a central rôle in this area - the
Commission of Médiation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA) - was never seized
with any conflicts. African states preferred to settle their disputes through other
channels, as these do not - contrary to the CMCA - emphasize formal, legalistic
procedures in the settlement of conflicts.
While the institutional reforms in 1992-1993 strengthened the Secrétariat's* rôle in
this issue area, its officials have always been engaged in monitoring conflicts. To this
purpose they drafted reports to the Secretary-General and formulated recommendations
to him as to whether or not to launch médiation initiatives. This work has always been
of a subordinate nature in OAU conflict management, as Secrétariat functionaries have
only limited autonomous powers: their task is restricted to advice and persuasion.
Moreover, the functioning of the OAU and its staff has always been considerably
affected by the constraints inherent in the organization's parsimonious budget (annual-
ly some thirty million dollars). The gathering and analysis of information has therefore
been hampered by insufficient research facilities and limited funds for travel.
43 C. Rico, 'The Contadora Expérience and the Future of Collective Security', in R.J. Bloomfield and
G.F. Treverton (eds), Alternative to Intervention: A New U.S.-Latin American Security Relationship
(Boulder and London, 1990), ch. óandSalkin, 'Sommeil ou réveil'.
44 The data on the OAU are drawn from Van Walraven, Dreams of Power, chs. Vu-Vin.
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However, in an effort to improve the effectiveness of OAU conflict management the
Secrétariat was reinforced, in 1992, by the establishment of a Division on Conflict
Management inside its Political Department. The new Division must engage in the
monitoring, gathering and analysis of information. This monitoring work should enable
the Secretary-General and other OAU institutions to improve the effectiveness of OAU
conflict management. One report of the Secretary-General speaks in this regard of the
désire to establish an 'early warning system' with which not only to manage, but also
prevent conflicts. This is not explicated further and seems to point more to the future
than the present. Moreover, while the rationale of these institutional reforms was
partially couched in the language of conflict prevention and early warning, it was noted
at the beginning of this chapter that they were essentially meant to ensure a response as
such or speed up the OAU's reactions to existing conflicts.
At least until 1993 the Secretary-General's rôle was rather limited as far as conflict
management was concemed. When the OAU was founded in 1963 African states made
it crystal clear that they were opposed to a Secretary-General having prérogatives in the
political sphère. This, it was held, would endanger their cherished sovereignty. While
incumbent Secretaries nevertheless tried, to a greater or lesser extent, to develop a
political rôle for themselves, in the area of conflict management their influence was
constricted by the OAU' s limited resources; the lack of formal prérogatives; the various
cleavages marking inter-African relations; the préférence of member states for médi-
ation by political figures; and, later on, the growing importance of the Assembly
chairman.
The Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government
have always been central in OAU dispute seulement. As possibilities to exert influence
in inter-African relations are relatively restricted and means of communications are
rather underdeveloped, their sessions provide an important opportunity for behind-the-
scenes negotiations and médiation initiatives. Mediators or groups of mediators are
always selected (or self-appointed) on an ad hoc basis, with unilateral member state
initiatives usually given the blessing of the Council or Assembly as a whole. In view of
the concentration of domestic presidential power, disputants have always exhibited a
strong préférence for médiation by fellow heads of state. It is their prestige and
influence, rather than the professional qualities of lower-rank diplomats, that constitute
important conditions for successful médiation. As the president who is the current
chairman of the Assembly usually enjoys added prestige, this head of state often has a
particularly important rôle in conflict management.
While the OAU' s first twenty years could boast, as compared to other international
organizations, an average success record in abating conflicts, after the 1970s this went
into décline as a result of a général détérioration in (mainly domestic) security contexts.
As was mentioned above, until 1990 the organization could not concern itself with
domestic conflicts, except those that had clearly developed important implications for
inter-African relations - such as substantial extra-African interférence. In 1990 this
ban was officially lifted.
There was, however, a need for reform of the OAU's approach to conflicts in genera! -
whether inter-state or domestic. Thus, the decentralized approach to conflicts entailed
problems of coordination in regard to multiple attempts at médiation, as well as
problems of continuity of effort. More importantly, it detracted from the O AU's
promptitude. Opportunities for tbird party intervention depended to some extent on
meetings of the policy organs, which are difficult to convene at short notice. Reliance on
presidential médiation also diminished swift responses, as it makes intervention
dependent on the political will of individual heads of state, their agenda and member
state resources. This state of affairs could lead to disastrous conséquences if the OAU
was faced with high-intensity conflicts like the Ogaden war (1977-1979) or conflicts
marked by large-scale human suffering, such as the Senegalese-Mauritanian dispute of
1989-1990.
Thus, the 1993 Cairo summit approved the introduction of the 'Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution', which aimed at improving coopér-
ation between two OAU organs: the Secrétariat, headed by the Secretary-General, and
the Bureau of the Assembly. The Secretary-General was given the formal right of
diplomatic initiative, which entitled him to undertake or send médiation and fact-
finding missions or dispatch special envoys. Ever since their introduction, the Secré-
tariat has been making active use of these prérogatives. The Secretary-General must
exercise nis new rôle under the authority of the Bureau of the Assembly and in consulta-
tion with its chairman. The new Bureau is composed of the chairman, his eight vice-
chairmen and the outgoing president, who remains a member for one year. Moreover,
the future Assembly chairman is, if hè is already known, also a member of the Bureau.
These are all member state représentatives. The Bureau now convenes once a month at
> ambassadorial level, usually in Addis Ababa; twice a year at the level of foreign
'• ministers ; and once at that of heads of state. It may also be convened at short notice, in
extraordinary session, at the request of the Assembly chairman, the Secretary-General
or any member state. The Bureau has overall political responsibility and supervision
and must report to the Assembly. It also takes décisions on the more far-reaching
' aspects of médiation initiatives, such as deployment of civilian or military observer
, missions.
As thé Secretary-General has, besides executive tasks with regard to Bureau
> décisions, his own political prérogatives, thé Bureau and Secretary-General must
cooperate closely. The basic idea is that the Secretary-General launches a médiation
initiative, on the basis of the Secrétariat's monitoring work. Then he informs thé
Bureau of its outcome and thé Bureau may be convened. The rôle of the Secretary-
General is meant to provide thé necessary speedy response, while the Bureau gives vital
political backing and guidance. However, with regard to inter-state disputes thé Bureau
should still be able to mandate individual heads of state or thé Assembly chairman to
engage in médiation. Ad hoc commutées may be appointed for thé duration of a
conflict. While copying established practice, thé Bureau's involvement should provide
thèse procédures with greater coordination and continuity.
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The new mechanism is more than a paper reform. Apart from médiation efforts by the
Secretary-General, the Bureau has been convened at different times as well. For
instance, its ability to respond swiftly was borne out when it met in October 1993 on the
same day of the coup attempt in Burundi. Besides response capacity the mechanism
could, in principle, also improve upon the limited dynamics of OAU decision-making.
Because of the large number of member states, decision-making in the Council of
Ministers and the Assembly is by définition slow and laborious. The Bureau's limited
membership, which annually rotâtes among the member states, should speed things up.
However, as was argued above, the organization is usually still overtaken by the pace of
events. While its response capacity has improved, its institutional and procédural
provisions are still more geared to abating existing violent conflicts than to their
prevention äs such.
The institutional arrangements of ECOWAS in the area of conflict Containment and
prévention are as yet largely non-existent. As mentioned above, it has until now only
focused on solving thé civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Procedures with regard to
conflicts have been scarce, since the organization has a predominantly economie
mandate. Moreover, intervention in the Liberian civil war took place on the basis of ad
hoc arrangements since the institutions stipulated in the 1981 Defence Protocol were
never established. This instrument stipulated a rôle in abating inter-state or domestic
conflicts for the existing 'Authority' - the suprême organ of ECOWAS - as well as for
a projected Defence Council made up of foreign and defence ministers and a Defence
Commission composed of national chiefs of staff. In their absence it was a Standing
Mediation Committee (SMC) and the peace-keepers of the ECOWAS Cease-fire
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) which represented the institutional manifestation of
ECOWAS concern with Liberia. As yet, one can therefore not speak of genera!
institutional and procédural arrangements for the processing of signais on violent
conflicts in West Africa - neither existing nor potential.45 With its Organ on Politics,
Defence and Security, SADC seems in this respect to be one step ahead of the West
Africans.
EVALUATION
Clearly, there are interesting parallels in the way in which inter-governmental organiz-
ations process signais to potential or actual conflicts. While ASEAN and the OSCE
emphasize the importance of bilatéral consultation procedures, in the UN, OAS and
OAU processing of signais is mainly done through the work of the Secretary-General
45 See Inegbedion, 'ECOMOG in Comparative Perspective' and the articles in Issue, nos. 1-2, 1993.
Also M.A. Sesay, 'Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia', in Review ofAfrican Political
Economy, 1996, no. 67, p. 50. In August 1997 the annual ECOWAS summit decided to extend
formally ECOMOG' s mandate to cover, and try to remedy, the violent events and a recent coup d'état
in Sierra Leone. See the report of the Pan-African News Agency of 2 September 1997.
and his Secrétariat, though in coopération with a semi-permanent organ made up of
member states, whether plenary or limited in composition. During the 1980s and early
1990s the mandates of the chief officials of both the OAS and OAU were formally
upgraded to allow them a rôle in conflict management comparable to that of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
It is, nevertheless, obvious that the parallels in institutional approaches to conflicts
are limited. For example, the Santiago mechanism of the OAS bears all the hallmarks of
the couleur locale of Latin American politics. If one compares the processing of
signais of (impending) violence in the OSCE with the way this is done in other inter-
governmental organizations, one is immediately struck by the institution of the High
Commissioner, as there is no equivalent to this functionary elsewhere. More generally,
some of the OSCE's consultation procedures stand out for their intrusive nature as far
as state sovereignty is concerned. The Moscow mechanism is a typical example. Some
of the (consent-based) tasks of long-term missions are, however, comparable to
Boutros-Ghali's ideas on post-conflict peace-building in the framework of the United
Nations, which have been put in practice in the context of the peace settlements in
Cambodia and Mozambique. The institutional reforms in the OAS and OAU were
mainly aimed at generating quick responses, or any response at all. This had less
priority in the United Nations, where procédural arrangements enable the organization,
in principle, to react swiftly to emergencies. Finally, the performance of ECOWAS,
SADC and ASEAN in managing conflicts has its own peculiarities. In so far as there
are institutional manifestations, these stand more or less on their own.
Concluding Remarks
Inter-governmental organizations seldom have fully fledged early warning systems and
concrete policies of conflict prevention. Yet they often possess several institutional and
procédural arrangements that are relevant to the Containment, if not prevention, of
violent conflict. The OSCE seems in this respect to have gone quite some way in
developing a preventative approach to conflicts. It has therefore been suggested that
some of the OSCE's expériences could perhaps be usefully copied by other interna-
tional organizations.46 While little research has, as yet, been undertaken on this
question, this could indeed enhance the organizational capacity of other international
institutions vis-à-vis conflicts.
Nevertheless, one should caution against facile arguments about the possibilities of
transferring those expériences to other political and cultural contexts - or, for that
matter, against euphorie assessments of the OSCE. Thus, the OSCE is heavily depend-
46 See in this respect M.A. Ferdowski, 'Die KSZE als Modell?: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der
Anwendung in der dritten Welt', in Europa Archiv, 1992, pp. 76-84.
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ent on consensus between the member states, while the Implementation of ils consulta-
tion mechanisms is often interpreted as a hostile act of one state against another. The
structural features of international politics - such as absence of leadership - come into
playhere.
One may, moreover, wonder whether international organization-managed change
of domestic political and economie configurations and structures is not a bridge too far.
For example, a detailed study of the failures of UNOSOM in Somalia ended by listing
numerous tasks that the UN should in future try to take on, if it wanted to make a
différence in situations marked by state collapse47 - activities that belong, paradoxi-
cally, to the archetypal functions of a state, rather than of an international institution.
Thus, as mentioned in the first chapter, the growing importance of international
organizations in conflict management is related not so much to a rational considération
of their capabilities and the requirements posed by a crisis situation, as to the effects of
the end of the Cold War and résultant withdrawal of superpower concern with zones of
conflict. International organizations have been given tasks that were partly perfbrmed
by the superpowers - whose 'solutions' to conflicts were, of course, frequently worse
than the original problem - without an increase in capabilities and stature comparable
to that of those former leading actors. If media visualization of the misery of civil war
may, at times, générale sufficient moral repercussions to force international institutions
to take action, this in itself is usually not enough to compensate for the lack of political
will among their member states to act. Interventions such as in Somalia are therefore
easily derailed, while forceful action by thé UN or other organizations may alternate
with hésitation and précipitons withdrawal from thé théâtre of opération. The UN's
actions in Rwanda in 1994 are pertinent hère.
Still, the ideas that have been articulated by political scientists under thé headings
of early warning and conflict prevention would, if implemented even to a limited extent,
go a considérable way in shoring up thé capabilities of international organizations to
manage conflict. It is the task of researchers to investigate and extrapolate the condi-
tions for working successfully towards such a qualitative change in international
politics.
3 Humamtarian and Conflict
A Historieal Background Sketch
Howard Adelman
There are two historical sources for the use of early warning as a concept. One is to be
found in the intelligence Community. Early warning referred to a party 'A' possessing
advance notification of an imminent hostile act by an enemy 'B', enabling A to
undertake préventive action which could deter or even compel B to cancel the planned
action. A second source is to be found in référence to natural humanitarian disasters,
initially with respect to weather storms or earthquakes, but then applied to drought
conditions in order to anticipate famines. Thus, the Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO) developed the first early warning System that was not self-défensive. It was
designed to enable the FAO to stockpile and locate food supplies to prevent famine.
The first type of early warning System was designed to enable action to be taken to
deter an enemy's threat or mitigate its effects. The second was also concerned with
taking action, but to prevent or mitigate suffering of others.
In the UN System, early warning was initially associated with the first type and
traditional intelligence gathering to detect, deter, prevent, or counter hostile acts against
UN peace-keepers in the Congo.1 The roots of its contemporary conception, however,
are to be found in the humanitarian area. Intent on enabling the UN to prépare for and
perhaps even mitigate the causes of forced migration, a 1981 study by Prince Sadrunnin
for the UN Commission on Human Rights set forth a number of push and pull factors
which contributed to forced migration. Prince Sadrunnin recommended thé création of
an early warning System within the UN to study and track these push and pull factors.
This emphasis was reinforced when the Group of Government Experts to Avert New
Refugee Flows formally requested the UN Secretary-General to establish an office to
gather more complex information on refugee flows, and to report on that information in
a timely fashion.
With respect to the UN System, the UN initially attempted to model itself structur-
ally on the nation-state model by appending an intelligence apparatus to the executive
office. Pérez de Cuéllar initiated ORCI, the Office for Research and the Collection of
47 See Comprehensive Report on Lessons-Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia (see
note 9 above).
See A.W. Dom and D.J.H. Bell, 'Intelligence and Peacekeeping: The UN Operation in thé Congo,
1960-64,' in International Peacekeeping, l :2, spring 1995, pp. 11-33.
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